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18 January 1958

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
DAILY BRIEF


I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Tito is renewing his efforts to influence developments within the Eastern European satellites through closer party relations. He is counting particularly on expanding existing relations with Poland and Rumania. Although Belgrade is extremely skeptical of Hungarian advances, it will continue 25X1 to encourage them. The Soviet deputy commander in Berlin has notified Allied officials that effective 31 January travel documents of all passengers on Allied military trains to and from Berlin must be stamped by Soviet officials at the checkpoints or the trains will be turned back. Acceptance of such control would in effect allow the Russians to determine who may ride on military trains and would encourage the Russians to attempt further restrictions on Allied access to Berlin. 25X1

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The continuing instability of the Venezuelan regime is reflected in further arrests or deportations of former top-level military commanders and in rumors of additional cabinet changes as President Perez moves to consolidate his position. Students demonstrated for the fourth consecutive day on 16 January in an effort to rouse civilian sentiment against the government.

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DAILY BRIEF

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
I: THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Tito Again Attempting to Influence Satellites

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Tito is renewing his efforts to influence developments within the Eastern European satellites through closer party	
relations, He is counting particularly on expanding exist-	25X1
ing relations with Poland and Rumania. although Belgrade is extremely skeptical of recent Hun-	25X1
garian approaches, it will continue to encourage them.	25X1 25X1
Aware that his past crusading in the satellites was offensive to Moscow, Tito probably does not contemplate any accompanying campaign in the press and other propaganda media. Belgrade is dissatisfied, with the trend of events in the bloc, but foresees no increased tensions between Moscow and Belgrade. Both Belgrade and Moscow are trying to avoid any public discussion of their disagreements.	25X1
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Russians Increase Harassment of Allied Rail Access to Berlin

The Soviet deputy commander in Berlin has told Allied officials that effective 31 January the Allies must comply with new documentation procedures for military trains or have their trains turned back at the East German border. The new control procedures require Soviet stamping of individual travel documents of train passengers. The practice of the past 12 years has been merely to show the Russian control officers a list of passengers. A precedent exists for the new procedure, however, since individual travel documents of autobahn travelers and crew members of military freight trains are already subject to Soviet stamping.

In addition, the latest Soviet requirements also would prevent the issuance of extended travel orders for more than one round trip to Berlin, and would compel all travelers to use the same means of transportation for both parts of the trip.

the Russians to determine who may ride on military trains, and would encourage them to take additional steps aimed at			
restricting Allied access to the city.			

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Further Isolation of Celebes from Indonesian Government Probable

The Indonesian Government has decided to withdraw Javanese troops from South Celebes in East Indonesia by the end of March, in the hope of preserving the central government's political authority in the area and ending long-standing dissidence by eliminating friction between the Javanese and locally recruited battalions. The nine Javanese battalions will be replaced by locally recruited troops under the command of Major Jusuf, indigenous regimental commander.

The long-term effect of the government's decision is likely to be a considerable loosening of the bonds between Djakarta and the area. Autonomous sentiment in the area is strong, and the Javanese units had kept it partially in check. Although the Javanese withdrawal may result in at least the temporary cessation of guerrilla warfare, it will probably also lead to the greatly increased influence of Kahar Muzakkar, who has engaged in armed dissidence against the government since 1951. Major Jusuf and his troops, former guerrillas who surrendered to the government and chose army service, have a non-shooting agreement with Muzakkar.

In North Celebes, effective contact with the central
government is expected to cease. Djakarta has refused
to recognize that area's recent announcement of autonomous
provincial status. Heretofore, the entire island of Celebes
has nominally been a single province administered from
Makassar in the southern part of the island.

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